

An Efficient and Privacy-Aware Method for Revealing Network Covert Channels

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Covert Channels

- Stegomalware uses information hiding to:
 - Elude well-known detection • techniques
 - Orchestrate an attack ٠
 - Exfiltrate sensitive data ٠
 - ٠ . . .
- Covert channels mainly exploit: ٠
 - Host resources (CPU, memory • usage, etc.)
 - Traffic (HTTP, DNS, etc.) ٠
- Challenges: ٠
 - Unknown a priori •
 - Threat-dependent •
 - Scalability ٠
 - Privacy ٠





Figure 1. Local covert channel.



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
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extended Berkeley Packet Filter

eBPF leverages code-• augmentation features of the Linux kernel.




Process

recvmsg()

sendmsg()

Data Collection for Network Covert Channels


- Organization of the eBPF map: the whole range of values of a field is split into B equallyspaced **bins**. Each bin has a corresponding **counter**.
- Goals:
 - It guarantees privacy
 - It can be adapted to many protocols
 - Larger fields can be mapped into a smaller space





Marco Zuppelli et al. – CNR

Metrics and Detection

- Reveal of covert channels, by producing:
 - "new" metrics
 - a "pictorial" status of the network traffic (e.g., heatmaps)
- Example detection IPv6 use case:
 - Comparison between an estimate of active IPv6 flows and third-party measurements
 - Temporal evolution of heatmaps







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Conclusions

- Covert channels can target both host resources and network packets.
- eBPF guarantees the visibility on the entire host.
- Our framework ensures:
 - Privacy-awareness
 - Efficiency
 - Extensibility and scalability
- Current research goals:
 - Comparison with other security tools
 - Use of the eBPF framework to deal with other threats

